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Abstract 
The main purpose of the study is to identify the barriers of participation of the rural poor in microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) in Bangladesh. To this aim, data were collected through face to face interview from six 
different districts of Bangladesh. From the microfinance literature, the study set eight explanatory factors and six 
demographics which are explored through three separate models in examining the factors that influence the 
dependent variables such as nonparticipation and drop-out (Model 1), participation (Model 2) and nonparticipant 
but willing to participate (Model 3) in MFIs. Logistic regression techniques are employed in analyzing data. The 
results of Model 1 indicate that education, other assets and spousal dislike to female head of households are 
observed as the significant barriers of participation. The outcome of the Model 2 suggests that there have been 
six factors that inhibit the rural poor participation in MFIs which are gender, age, yearly income, land, religion 
and lack of knowledge. And in the Model 3, gender, education, land, insufficient resources and lack of 
knowledge appear to be the significant barriers to participation of the rural poor in MFIs in Bangladesh.   
Keywords: Poverty alleviation, rural poor, barriers to participation in MFIs, Bangladesh  
 
Introduction 
Developing world has experienced several paradigm shifts in development strategies (Ahmed 2004) since 
December 10, 1948 when poverty was attributed as a negation of all human rights by the declaration of the 
General Assembly of the United Nations. Article 25(1) of the declaration has proclaimed:  
“Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his 
family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care, and necessary social services, and the right 
to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of 
livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.” 
However, the result of each initiative failed to produce any significant result (Yunus, 1987). Against this 
backdrop, microcredit propelled its head start in Bangladesh in the early 1980s in the name of Grameen Bank 
with a promise to bring about development through alleviating rural poverty. The age of microfinance, popularly 
known as microcredit (Ahmed, 2009; Rutherford, 2003; Hulme, 2000) is now turned around thirty, but the level 
of poverty alleviation remains as an empirical question (Karim, 2011).     
Surge of literature came out during 1980s and 1990s with the result of positive impacts of microcredit on income 
and poverty alleviation (Hossain, 1984; Khan, 1990; Khandker, Khalily and Khan, 1995; Khandker and 
Chowdhury, 1996)). However, empirical evidences cast doubts on many of their positive impacts on poverty 
alleviation and raising income of the participants in MFIs. Recently, there have been a plethora of research 
articles which have criticized microfinance institutes (MFIs) from different dimensions particularly on poverty 
alleviation. Some of them have been even more critical to show that a few microfinance programs are rather 
harmful, plunging the poor deeper into debt (Dichter and Harper, 2007; Beck and Ogden, 2007). 
The criticisms, which center in prominence, lie around participation and nonparticipation of the rural poor in 
MFIs (Karim, 2011). The issues of nonparticipation include outreach, dropout, self-exclusion and overlapping of 
loans from multiple MFIs that are presumed to be important for persisting rural poverty (Caritas Bangladesh, 
2012; Halder and Mosley, 2004). For instance, Caritas Microfinance Program (CMFP) has recently closed 11 of 
its branches in different places of Bangladesh. The outstanding loan stood at Tk. 1,500 million as on June 30, 
2012 against the amount of Tk. 1,303 million in June 30, 2011. This means that growth of outstanding loan 
increases by 14 percent. During the same period of time, the annual decrease of members was 13,804 (Caritas 
Bangladesh, 2012) 
Interestingly, the potential reasons of nonparticipation are not widely addressed in microfinance related literature, 
though microfinance, since its initiation, has undergone many changes as an economic development scheme to 
assist low-income people in rural areas (Ashraf, 2013; Yuge, 2011). Low level of participation among the poor is, 
thus, still one of the main issues in microfinance sector which deserve attention by policy makers and researchers 
(Hes, Neradova and Srnec, 2013; Mahmud, 2000; Halder and Mosley, 2004). The main objective of the present 
study is, therefore, to investigate the potential factors that are assumed to influence the participation and 
nonparticipation of the rural poor in Bangladesh. 
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Participation and Nonparticipation: Conceptual Issues 
There have been different participation behaviors staged in the microfinance activities by the rural poor which 
warrant little clarification. While participation in MFIs is characterized by an individual level, household-level 
participation is perceived to be a derived one (Ashraf, 2013; Zohir, 2001).  If one or more members of a 
household participate in one or more MFIs, the particular household is also identified as “participant” (Zohir, 
2001).  
By and large, all individuals who report to be members of MFIs are identified as participants. However, one may 
distinguish between “active” and “passive” participation. Active participants are those who borrow funds, 
regularly attend the meetings and deposit required savings in MFIs. Hence, participation is operationally defined 
to include those who are active group members (Zohir, 2001). 
The above static classification is further complicated due to its instability in participation itself. The BIDS 
surveys over three phases show that a large number of individuals change their affiliation or temporarily 
disassociate themselves from the MFIs every year. Thus, one needs further classification across “never 
participated”, “ever participants”, “regular participants”, occasional participants” and “dropouts” (Ashraf, 2011a; 
Zohir, 2001). However, the present study adopted three simple classifications --- (i) “participants”: who are 
presently involved in borrowing from MFIs; (ii) “nonparticipants”: who are not presently involved in borrowing 
from MFIs which include the individuals who never participated in MFIs or dropouts from the MFIs and (iii) 
who are willing to participate.  
 
Theory and Past Research 
Microfinance theory has been widely acclaimed nationally and internationally as a potential tool for eradicating 
rural poverty since its inception as Grameen Bank in Bangladesh in 1983. The bank is a brainchild of Professor 
Muhammad Yunus who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006. Though this Nobel is a grand recognition for the 
great achievement of the Grameen Bank in poverty alleviation particularly from the rural areas of the developing 
world, huge criticisms from multiple dimensions have been casting pebbles against microfinance industry as a 
whole through empirical research globally. Some even posit that microfinance has done more to hurt the rural 
poor than to help them (Karim, 2011; Beck and Ogden, 2007; Dichter and Harper, 2007).  
Soon after 1983, the innovative model of the Grameen Bank has been replicated by many countries of the world 
including many developed nations. Until now, there is no empirical evidence which can testify that any society 
globally becomes successful in alleviating poverty from the society with the particular help of MFIs (Karim, 
2011). One may argue that human index as well as overall poverty condition in Bangladesh is much improved 
than before (Sen 2013).  However, it does not mean that the achievement of poverty alleviation in Bangladesh is 
entirely due to microfinance intervention (Ashraf, 2013; Dilal, 2009). Rather, there are other factors that 
influenced to reduce poverty in Bangladesh such as increase in agricultural productivity through green revolution, 
foreign remittance, increased investment and labor productivity, and mass employment opportunities in garments 
sector, financial sector, education and corporate business sectors (Ahmed, 2013).   
Owing to such ineffective role of microfinance industry in eradicating poverty, participation and membership 
growth in MFIs have appeared grotesque. In a longitudinal study, the nonparticipants in MFIs are observed to be 
28 percent (Zohir, 2001). However, the study notes that the census of households indicates that about 52 percent 
of rural households in program villages were nonparticipants (Zohir, 2001). Since stability in participation was 
presumed in earlier literature, most recent focus is placed on explaining the determinants of participation where 
presence of program placement effects and self-selection often obscure the results.  
Here in the following section, we discuss the factors underlying microfinance participation based on past 
research. The study identifies eight variables that are hypothesized to hinder the participation of the rural poor in 
MFIs which are: (i) fear of getting into risk in taking microfinance loans, (ii) individual preference of selecting 
the MFIs for borrowing, (iii) religious leaders’ lecture on microfinance borrowing, (iv) spousal dislike as female 
head of household, (v) friends’ advice on microfinance borrowing, (vi) insufficiency of resources, (vii) 
inadequate knowledge about business and (viii) illness or vulnerability to crises.   
(i) Fear of getting into risk in taking microfinance loans:  
Among the several socioeconomic service-providers available in Bangladesh, NGO-MFIs occupy the most 
remarkable place and the participation of the poor people in these NGO-MFIs is relatively higher (Ashraf, 2013; 
Rahman, 2009). However, perceptions of the poor in terms of expectation fulfillment and trust deficit in NGO-
MFIs stands among the lowest percentage points which lead the rural poor to be in misty confusion and high 
economic insecurity (Rahman, 2009). And the major consequences of insecurity are financial loss and mental 
anxiety (Karim, 2011; Rahman, 2009). In addition, harassment by many NGO-MFIs is a critical social element 
experienced by citizens of contemporary Bangladesh (Dyal-Chand, 2007; Ferdous and Uddin, 2010).  
A recent study revealed the analytical content of this harassment indicator and reports a significant range of 
misconduct from the NGO-MFIs experienced by the poor who are to pay high economic costs (Ferdous and 
Uddin, 2010). For instance of harassment, the residents of Arampur in northern Bangladesh report horror stories 
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such as physical and sexual abuse of borrowers in the hands of MFIs’ officials. Unauthorized repossession of 
assets, including even the roof of the house of a loan recipient, frequently happens when borrowers miss their 
installments (Ferdous and Uddin, 2010).  
In the case of arrears and defaults, there have been several daunting disturbing stories available in microfinance 
literature since 1990s (Karim, 2011; Rahman, 1999). By and large, conventional MFIs used to utilize group and 
center pressure to force the borrowers to make weekly repayments of their loans. When the peer pressure fails to 
pay the weekly installment of the loans, sometimes threats from the MFIs are followed and in extreme cases, 
assets of the poor borrowers are auctioned by the MFIs for repaying the loans (Ferdous and Uddin, 2010). In 
such way, many rural poor lost all of their scanty belongings including houses and small home-lands (Karim, 
2011). 
As the MFIs began to mature, they started facing performance dilemma, and focus is gradually shifted towards 
profitability. In order to improve profitability of MFIs, interest rate on loan is kept at a very high level and 
additional costs in the form of margin money, compulsory savings and insurance premium are being imposed to 
borrowers (Elahi and Rahman, 2006).  
Majority of microfinance borrowers in rural Bangladesh are poor and illiterate. So, they are not in a position to 
understand and realize various financial terms and conditions used by MFIs and their effective costs. To help the 
poor to understand true costs of loan, MFIs should disclose effective interest rate to the borrowers. Hiding 
effective interest rate to poor and illiterate borrowers by using “creative” accounting practices is highly unethical. 
Many MFIs simply state that they charge only 15% flat rate of interest (Pine, 2010). Nonetheless, the effective 
interest rate including processing fee, insurance premiums and compulsory savings goes well over 100% per 
annum (Karim, 2011; Dilal, 2009). 
In order to pay back the loans timely, bank workers as well as group-members impose an extreme demand on 
their clients (Ferdous and Uddin, 2010). In this situation, many borrowers used to maintain their regular 
repayment schedules through a process of loan recycling which considerably increases the debt-liability on the 
individual households, increases tension and frustration among household members, produces new forms of 
dominance over women and increases violence in society (Dyal-Chand, 2007; Rahman, 1999). This type of 
apprehension is widespread in the rural society of Bangladesh where people appeared to be reluctant to be 
member of any MFIs (Karim, 2011). Thus, fear appears to be potential barrier to the rural poor participation in 
MFIs in Bangladesh. 
(ii) Individual preference of selecting the MFIs for borrowing 
Individual preference is hypothesized in this study as another barrier to participation in MFIs. Ideally, preference 
is the power or ability to choose one thing over another with the anticipation that the choice will result in greater 
satisfaction, greater capability or improved performance (Schiffman and Kanuk, 2000). Thus, in first preference, 
people try to have loans from informal sources. One of the important sources of informal loans is the friend or 
relative who occupies a substantial part of rural money market (Mahmud, 2010). 
So, if anybody has that chance of getting informal loans, s/he does not wish to take the loans from MFIs. In fact, 
when the poor villagers have left with no other choices, microfinance is considered to be their last resort. “I don’t 
want to take microcredit loans,” said one villager, “but at times of food shortage in the dry season, I am left with 
no other choice” (Ferdous and Uddin, 2010, p. 43). Thus, many people in the village in northern Bangladesh 
became constrained to take loans during a household crisis such as lack of foods in the house or medical 
emergencies. For many, the borrowing initiated a cycle of debt which they could never escape. As mentioned 
earlier that the northern part of Bangladesh is declared as a famine-affected area, from where people prefer to 
migrate in the off-season of crop production rather than taking loans from the MFIs for doing any small-business 
staying in their own locality (Mahmud, 2010).  
There has been another significant question whether MFIs are serving the poorest of the poor ensuring their 
successful participation in microfinance programs (Hashemi and Rosenberg, 2006). Soliciting case studies of 
CARE/Bangladesh and BRAC/Bangladesh, one report argues that in Bangladesh where MFIs are strongly 
committed to serve the poor, MFIs’ concentration is the highest among the second poorest quintile group and the 
lowest among the poorest quintile. The main reason behind this is identified as deliberate program exclusion 
from MFIs (Hashemi and Rosenberg, 2006).  
According to a study, young women have a higher preference for credit than older women (Khandker, Koolwal 
and Sinha, 2008). The study compares the results for young women’s program participation with those of 
program participation by two other groups --- older women (31 and older) and men residing in the households. 
The young women’s borrowing is statistically significantly different from that of men’s borrowing but not 
different from that of older women. However, the marginal returns to program participation are significantly 
higher for younger women than older women (Khandker, Koolwal and Sinha, 2008).   
Finally, the debate about whether to lend to individuals or lend to groups is very important issue. Under simple 
theories of selection, the Pareto superior regime predicts to emerge variation with exogenous environmental 
characteristics (Townsend, 2003). The microfinance programs, which are originated in Bangladesh, primarily 
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operate in group lending where individual preference does not play any role in using loans in individual 
entrepreneurial activities (Ashraf, 2013). Thus, it may pose a serious problem in getting individual success in 
loan operation on an individual basis rather than on a group basis (Townsend, 2003). 
In this respect, some argue that nonparticipation might simply be a function of individual or household 
preferences, because credit may not be in their best short or long-term interest (Evans et al., 1999). These 
preferences could change the participants’ and nonparticipants’ attitude towards behavioral intention (Ajzen, 
1991), which encourages for not being the member of the MFIs.  
(iii) Religious leaders’ lecture on microfinance borrowing 
The rural society of Bangladesh is built in local networks in which religion takes a prominent place, because 
around 87 percent people are Muslim (BBS, 2011) and Islam is the state religion in Bangladesh. Around 90 
percent of the laws in Bangladesh are secular. So, there are legal problems in Bangladesh arising from 
unresolved conflicts in the law. Hence, women independence or women empowerment program is against the 
beliefs of many strict Muslims (Ahmad, 2009).  
Some studies find that women violating purdah (females’ physical exposure without any headscarf and extra 
clothes) by joining an interest-based microcredit program have violated the Islamic principles. So these activities 
are strongly condemned by religious leaders who attack on microcredit institutions defending the religious 
values of Islam (Ashraf, 2013; Hashemi and Schuler, 1992; the Economist, 2000).  
The issue of gender inequality is also important in the environment where social activities are based on existing 
socioeconomic inequality of women (Dyal-Chand, 2007; Heaton and Cornwall, 1989). Empirical evidence 
suggests that much of the variation in the relative socioeconomic status of women is due to differences in family 
behavior, and there is little evidence for the declining influence of religion in family behavior or in the 
socioeconomic inequality of women (Dyal-Chand, 2007). So, it evidently shows how religious point of view in 
looking at the status of women is a factor for participating in MFIs.  
(iv)  Spousal dislike as female head of household 
In most of the developing countries, society is dominated mostly by the male partner of the family. Yet, the 
majority of the borrowers of conventional MFIs are women (Ashraf 2013; Caritas Bangladesh, 2012; Rahman, 
1996). The objective of targeting women in the conventional approach is women empowerment (Caritas 
Bangladesh, 2012; Karim, 2011; Rahman, 1999). The rationale is that women use the funds efficiently to 
increase their income levels. As a result, they become more independent and this increases their self-respect. 
However, some recent studies show that this is not the case (Ashraf, 2013; Karim, 2011; Khandker, 1998; 
Rahman, 1999). The women are usually persuaded by the male members of the household to obtain credit and to 
utilize it. However, the repayment of the loan installment remains on the shoulder of the women who is deemed 
primarily as the borrower. This generates chaos and conflicts inside the family (Ashraf, 2011b). 
There has been evidence that microcredit can reduce vulnerability in terms of smoothing income and 
consumption, and building asset (Zaman, 2004). However, there is a considerable confusion on the impact of 
credit on women’s empowerment, or reducing female vulnerability (Karim, 2011). Empowerment of women in 
Bangladesh can be considered on the patriarchal socioeconomic background. Empowerment has been defined as 
a “set of social relations with a material base that enables men to dominate women” (Cain, Khanum and 
Nahar,1979, p. 405). Hence, it can be thought of as an improvement in intra-household gender relations 
(Hashemi, Schuler and Riley, 1996).  Moreover, given the institution of purdah, an enveloping social matrix 
controls the female society within a typical Bangladeshi household (Ashraf, 2011b; Mahmud, 1994). 
There are more interesting stories which reveal that while women are meant to be the primary targets of MFIs, 
they are more often the conduits of credits, not end-users Ferdous and Uddin; 2010). In this context, one villager 
explained, “Women take loans because their husbands ask them to do so. In most cases, failure to repay is not 
their fault, but because their husbands either squandered the money or lost it in a wrong investment. Instead of 
being empowered, these women are like chilies crushed between the mortar and the pestle. On one side, their 
husbands put pressure on them. On the other side, MFIs chase them for being loan defaulters.” (Ferdous and 
Uddin 2010, p. 43) 
Some authors observe that the female-headed households are experiencing much socioeconomic disadvantages 
which range from economic discrimination to social stigmatization and isolation. This situation limits the 
capability of these women to meet up the endowment requirements for participating in microcredit schemes. 
Normally, the spouses of the female members of the MFIs do not like their wife to be the chief of the household 
(Ashraf, 2013; Buvinic and Gupta, 1997).  This fact frequently acts as an important catalyst for family 
disintegration in rural Bangladesh (Rahman, 1999). In many instances, obeying purdah by the Muslim ladies is 
argued to be mandatory by the male spouses based on religious principles of Islam which may act as an 
important barrier to participation in MFIs (Ashraf, 2011b). 
However, there are other studies that show that many families are getting disintegrated which is blamed as a 
result of women empowerment in the rural areas of Bangladesh (Ashraf, 2013). In fact, freedom is a risky 
business, because the rural women are mostly uneducated and this dimension of the rural society causes the 
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women to be demotivated to peacefully lead their family life (Bush, 2013).  
(v) Friends advice on microfinance borrowing 
In rural areas, people are relatively more closely associated with each other than urban areas (Feldman, 1999). 
Thus, neighbors sometimes play a crucial role in influencing decision making process of others (Ajzen, 1999). 
As there are scanty evidences that participants are graduating from poor to non-poor, the rural poor used to be 
demotivated to participate in the microfinance programs (Ahmed, 2004). Besides, there are evidences of 
overlapping loans from various MFIs simultaneously and consequently the borrowers get caught in the vicious 
circle of debt trap (Ashraf, 2011c; Rahman, 1996). For this reason, the poor sometimes become compelled to 
dispose whatever they possess as asset in order for repaying back the debt. Thus, the poor become poorer getting 
into the debt-spiral (Beck and Ogden, 2007). These events created an ugly impression of microfinance programs 
to the rural poor for which they used to advice their peers and relatives not to participate in MFIs.  
On April 14, 2010, a television program in Bangladesh aired a mind-boggling incidence. A few youths in a 
village of Naogaon district in northern Bangladesh were taking their own lives after failing to repay their loans. 
The cause of such tragedies was being claimed to be exorbitant interest rates, which trap the borrowers into a 
never-ending loop (Ferdous and Uddin, 2010). 
Similar experience is shared by a villager of Rangpur district of northern Bangladesh with the author of the 
present study. According to his experience, the poor villagers have been suffering from the extortions of three 
types of people in Bangladesh such as the corrupt police forces, the greedy and dishonest medical doctors and 
finally the MFIs (Ashraf, 2011b). Having witnessed these scenarios of microfinance, friends in the neighborhood 
express negative impression about MFIs which discourages the poor not to participate in microfinance programs.  
(vi) Insufficiency of resources 
In the rural areas of Bangladesh, insufficiency of resources of the rural poor is frequently observed as an 
important impediment of participation in MFIs (Ashraf, 2011b; Montgomery, 1996). A case study on BRAC 
reports that there ought to have compatibility between credit disbursement and need of the poor borrowers in the 
rural areas of Bangladesh (Montgomery, 1996, Rahman, 1999). Due to this mismatch between demand and 
supply of microfinance, the poor are failing to make their own resource-base. It also argues that the poor can be 
rescued from socially damaging peer pressure lending practices through flexible repayment scheduling, savings 
facilities and short-term consumption loans with a bit higher interest rate.  
In order to get loan from MFIs, the participants need to have sufficient resource-base to fulfill certain 
requirements such as adequate time to attend meetings, cash reserves for savings, and energy and motivation for 
education and planning activities (Ashraf, 2013; Evans et al., 1999). Owing to this lacking of sufficient resources, 
the rural ultra-poor used to face tremendous difficulties for memberships in MFIs. Even, the microfinance 
program itself has no incentive to provide loans to the extreme poor, mainly because the ultra-poor are thought to 
be risky clients who would not be able to pay back their loan duly (Ashraf, 2011c). 
Hence, the poorest of Bangladesh have number of constraints such as fewer income sources, worse health and 
education (Zaman, 2004). So this kind of lacking in terms of sufficient resources prevent the rural poor to utilize 
the loans with a significant level of efficacy which may affect the participation of the rural poor in MFIs (Ashraf, 
2011c). 
Proper allocation of time (how much time to spend on different tasks) is also considered to important which may 
inhibit some individuals to participate in MFIs (Dewhurst, Hancock and Ellsworth, 2013). This object is 
particularly applicable for the rural female for whom time has an opportunity cost which may not be affordable 
by them (Noble, 2010; Evans et al., 1999). 
(vii) Inadequate knowledge about business  
Across a broad range of literatures, a consensus has emerged that our society is moving toward postindustrial or 
post-bureaucratic society in which knowledge and information drive economic growth (Dewhurst, Hancock and 
Ellsworth, 2013; Benkler, 2006; Castells, 2000; Huber, 2004; Powell and Snellman, 2004; Sunstein, 2006; Teece, 
2003) According to some studies, there has been a disability of knowledge of the potential clients which 
compromise to understand the benefits of credit (Ashraf, 2011b; Jazairy et al., 1992). Evidences also suggest that 
people have a desire to join the program, to function within a peer group and to successfully utilize credit, but 
due to extreme poverty they cannot afford to do it (Ashraf, 2013).  
One of recent studies reports that the field officers of MFIs used to promote microcredit to the poor, as the sales 
executives of commercial banks promote personal loans and credit cards (Ferdous and Uddin, 2010). Their main 
objective is to sell loans, not to bring about any change in the lives of the rural poor. It saddles the loan recipients 
with the insidious burden of dependency contrary to economic freedom. In addition to this reality, a villager’s 
saying is worthwhile to note: 
“In the beginning, the NGOs told us their loans would bring joy to our lives if we borrowed from them and 
started a business. They lured us into the loans by telling  that we would have chickens, latrines, and many 
other things to lead a good life.  That good life became obvious as we sank deeper into the quicksand of 
illusion  created by them. This illusion eventually tightens around our neck like a noose.” (Ferdous and Uddin, 
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2010, p. 43)  
(viii) Illness or vulnerability to crises 
The size of the vulnerable population, who are at the risk of falling into deeper poverty, is large in Bangladesh. A 
high concentration of consumption expenditure around poverty lines implies that shocks can cause large 
movements in poverty rates (Ahmed, Narayan and Zaman, 2009). The relative positions of the upper and lower 
poverty lines and the density curve also suggest that a large number of population falls between the upper and 
lower poverty line levels. This fact implies that even a small shock can send a large number of individuals, many 
of whom are already poor, into extreme deprivation (Ahmed, Narayan and Zaman, 2009). 
Natural disasters, due to seasonal cycles, play a key part in poverty process in Bangladesh (Rahman, 1995). In 
this respect, asset creation is an important determinant which can reduce household vulnerability to various 
livelihood crises (Zaman, 2004). And one pathway by which microfinance appears to reduce this vulnerability is 
through the emergency assistance provided by many microfinance organizations during acute natural disasters, 
such as the recent floods in Bangladesh (Mahmud, 2010). The fact that these organizations turn into de facto 
relief agencies which is crucial to sustaining these households in the immediate aftermath of a natural disaster. 
Moreover, post-disaster rehabilitation assistance, in terms of both financial and other services, is also highly 
valued by microcredit participants (Mahmud, 2010). 
One study reveals that while microcredit is successful at reaching the poor, it is less successful at reaching the 
vulnerable poor (Amin, Rai and Topa, 2003). The results of this study also suggest that microcredit is 
unsuccessful at reaching the group most prone to destitution or the vulnerable poor. This finding indicates that 
participation of the destitute in microfinance program is still in unsatisfactory level which warrants further 
attention in order to alleviate rural hard core poverty in Bangladesh (Amin, Rai and Topa, 2003). 
There is different opinion that microcredit often improves the capacity of households’ risk management capacity 
through the enhancement of social capital. This is partly achieved by deliberate training and capacity-building 
efforts and partly through fungibility of loan proceeds into the building up of social networks (Mosley and Rock, 
2004). This, in turn, may lead to ‘poverty externalities’ through the extension of credit groups to include poor 
people and through the stabilization of rural income, to reduce the vulnerability of the poorest to risk (Mosley 
and Rock, 2004). 
However, other studies show that microfinance program participants do not benefit in terms of greater level of 
consumption, but they participate because they benefit from risk reduction by diverting the funds from investing 
in microenterprises to consumption (Yuge, 2011; Morduch, 1998).  Like others, ill-health of the rural poor or any 
types of crisis may hamper the ability to operate the microenterprises successfully. This may refer to a barrier to 
participation (Ashraf, 2013).   
Participation is further constrained among potential clients suffering from ill-health or other crises that limit their 
capacity to acquire and utilize credit (Yuge, 2011). This is in other words called morbidities or susceptibility to 
outer shock or crisis. This problem can hamper the borrowers’ self-efficacy to handle the loans for their income 
generating activities (Rahman et al., 1992) 
Thus, there is a need for a holistic approach to risk management, or "social risk management", which 
encompasses a broad spectrum of private and public actions (Ashraf, 2011b). An asset-based approach to social 
risk management can provide an integrated approach to consider household, community, and extra-community 
assets and risk management strategies. In effect of this vulnerability crisis, the rural poor face problem to get 
membership in MFIs (Ashraf, 2013; Amin, Rai and Topa, 2000).  
 
Data Sources 
The data collection exercises were aimed at gathering information on the impact of eight factors along with the 
demographics that may affect participation and nonparticipation of the rural poor in MFIs in Bangladesh. To this 
aim, data were collected by face to face interview from six major areas of Bangladesh using closed-end 
questionnaire interviewing 424 respondents who are participating (144 respondents) and nonparticipating  (280 
respondents) in MFIs in Bangladesh. The questionnaires were constructed in a 5-point scale except the 
participation variable which is dichotomous as 1 indicates yes and 2 indicates no. In the measurement for other 
variables, scale 1 indicates strongly disagree and scale 5 indicates strongly agree.  
The respondents of this study are the rural villagers who are nonparticipating, participating and willing to 
participate in MFIs in six different regions of Bangladesh. These areas of data collection were selected based on 
the poverty concentration and considerably long duration of microfinance operation. The poverty index was 
collected from the public and academic sources of information recorded in the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics 
and several research journals.  
Participating rural poor (also referred to as members of the MFIs) are defined as those individuals who have 
been presently borrowing microloans from the MFIs. Nonparticipating rural poor (also referred to as non-
members or drop-outs from the MFIs) are those individuals who choose not to be involved in borrowing 
microcredit from their local existing MFIs. The respondents, who are willing to participate, refer to never-
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participants as well as drop-outs from the MFIs. The sample statistic of the present study is provided in Table I 
indicating valid percentage of the demographic parameters. 
 
Table I Sample Statistics 
                                                                                                                Valid Percent 
Gender 
 Male                   13.8 
 Female                 86.2  
Age  
 15-25         11.2 
 26-40         56.4 
 41-55         23.1 
 56-60 and above          9.3 
 
Marital Status 
 Single           9.3 
 Married         89.3 
 Divorced          1.7 
 
Education 
 Primary          64 
 Secondary        26.7 
 Higher Secondary         5.5 
 Bachelor          3.8 
 
Yearly Household Income (in Taka) 
 0-20000         11 
 20001-40000        11.6 
 40001-70000        23.6 
 70001-100000        27.6 
 More than 100000       26.2 
 
Total Land including Home (in Decimal)  
 0         25 
 1-33         36.9 
 34-66         20 
 67-100         9.3 
 More than 100        8.8 
 
Other Assets (in Taka) 
 0-20000         60.2 
 20001-40000        4.5 
 40001-70000        7.6 
 70001-100000        6.7 




Identification of the factors that explain the behavior of the rural poor participation in MFIs is considered as an 
important issue which needs to be addressed adequately. By and large, a host of client-related and program-
related factors determine the involvement of individuals in MFIs. The present study deals with the client-related 
factors that inhibit them to participate in MFIs.  
The study uses the primary data to anticipate on the potential barriers of the rural poor to program participation. 
For each of the barriers, discussed in separate sections, the study briefly advances some preliminary thoughts on 
participation, describes the model with short elaboration on some important determinants and finally presents the 
results with their interpretations.  
The study initiates participation in MFIs as a rational response on the part of the individuals to the stimulation 
caused by a range of pecuniary and non-pecuniary provisions of the MFIs. Whether their response constitutes a 
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cognizable pattern, with regards to the socioeconomic characteristics of the households and to those of the 
borrowers in the households, is what we are to point out at this level.  
In so doing, the study first constructs the models explaining the participation attributes of individuals and 
examines it using the data of 424 households in six program villages in Bangladesh. The study then identifies the 
barriers that explain the participation behavior of the individuals. Including dichotomous nature of the outcome 
variable in the model, the study uses the logistic regression for estimation of the models.  
The Models 
As barriers or determinants of participation can be examined from various different perspectives, the simplest 
form of distinguishing is merely between participation and nonparticipation. However, the present study 
considers participation from a variety of concerns. Most analyses include participation just having dichotomized 
between participants and nonparticipants which may lead to a selectivity bias. The questionnaire that is designed 
for this study to collect data provides the prospects of collecting additional information on willingness to 
participate or not to participate in MFIs.  
This added information yields to identify three mutually exclusive household-members such as (1) those of 
group who are currently nonparticipating, but might participate before (2) those of group who are currently 
participating and (3) those of group who are nonparticipating and willing to participate. These groupings aided 
the study to conduct the analyses on a more meaningful way for four independent subsets of data.  
The first set representing Model 1 utilizes the data set of group (1) for those who are presently nonparticipants 
and participated before (i.e. dropouts).  Model 2 represents the data set of the group (2) who are currently 
participating in MFIs. And finally, Model 3 is analyzed with the data set of group (3) who are willing to 
participate in future. While an identical set of explanatory variables has been used in all the four models, the 
results are interpreted independently.  
As mentioned earlier, the present study employed altogether 424 households among the six districts of 
Bangladesh. The criteria of the respondents in terms of their participation status for the four groups are as 
follows. In the data set of sample group (1), there have been 232 (55%) responded as participated before and 192 
(45%) are never participated in MFIs. This means that there are 55 percent borrowers are dropouts and about a 
half of the sample population is nonparticipating in the study areas.  
In sample group (2), 144 (34%) individuals are presently participating in MFIs and 280 (66%) are 
nonparticipating in any MFIs. In sample group (3), 240 (56%) individuals responded to be willing to participate 
in MFIs in future and 184 (44%) individuals responded to be unwilling to participate in future. 
For identifying the factors that affect the participation behavior of the rural poor in MFIs, the logistic regression 
equation was set as below: 
Yi (i =1,2,3) = f (X1, X2, X3, X4, X5, X6, X7, X8, X9, X10, X11, X12, X13, X14, X15) 
Where, 
Y1 (Model 1): dummy variable, 1 for participated in MFIs before, 0 otherwise 
Y2 (Model 2): dummy variable, 1 for who are participating in MFIs, 0 for nonparticipants 
Y3 (Model 3): dummy variable, 1 for who are willing to participate in MFIs, 0 otherwise 
X1: Sex 
X2: Age 
X3: Marital Status 
X4: Education 
X5: Yearly household income 
X6: Total amount of land including homestead area 
X7: Value of other assets 
X8: Fear of getting into risk of borrowing from MFIs 
X9: Individual preference for borrowing 
X10: Religious leaders’ lecture on borrowing from MFIs 
X11: Spousal dislike as female head of household 
X12: Friends’ advice on borrowing from MFIs 
X13: Insufficiency of resources 
X14: Lack of knowledge in business 
X15: Ill-health or vulnerability to crises 
 
Results and Discussion 
There has been a common belief among the microfinance activists and researchers that all individuals are free to 
choose whether to participate in MFIs and that participation is self-selective (Pitt and Khandker, 1995). In this 
respect, Mahmud (2000) is naïve to argue that the rural individuals do not enjoy such freedom to join in MFIs 
because the choice is not entirely free. There have been myriads of household level differences among 
participating and nonparticipating individuals which suggest that potential client-related factors influence the 
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decision to participate in MFIs.   
Table 2: Results of Logistic Estimation on Participation in MFIs 
Explanatory 
Variables  
Model 1  














Gender -.940*** .391 -1.299*** .273 -.698*** .498 
Age -.289* .749 -.464** .629 -.046 .955 
Marital status -.367 .687 -.046 .955 .069 1.858 
Education .512*** 1.669 .612*** 1.844 .529*** 1.697 
Yearly income -.207** .813 -.271** .762 .246** 1.279 
Land -.028 .973 -.287** .750 -.278** .757 
Other assets .251*** 1.285 .375*** 1.455 .137* 1.147 
Fear .195 1.215 .281* 1.325 .468*** 1.597 
Preference .024 1.024 -.074 1.077 .827*** 1.286 
Religion -.509*** .601 -.863*** .422 .301** 1.351 
Spousal dislike .407*** 1.503 .337** 1.401 .069 1,072 
Friends’ advice -.196 822 .089 1.093 -.028 .972 
Resources  -.124 .883 -.084 .920 -.506*** .603 
Knowledge -.069 .933 -.398*** .672 -.480*** .619 
Ill-health -.122 .885  .052*** 1.053 .054 1.055 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
Correctly predicted (%)       76.30                           75.90                            74.8 
-2 Log Likelihood                       493.444                       410.633                      456.737 
Model Chi-Squares (Sig,)        90.560(000)              132.753(000)              123.634(000) 
 
Note: *** = significant at 1% level; **= significant at 5% level; *=significant at 10% level    
The estimation results of the three different models specified above have been presented in Table 2. The model 
chi-squares (90.560, 132.753 and 123.634) for the all three models and the significance level of 0.000 indicate 
that null hypothesis that the coefficients of all the variables in the model are zero can be rejected at better than 99 
percent level. In the first model, seven variables excluding constant are found statistically significant and the 
model on the whole can predict 76 percent of the cases correctly.  
In the second and the third model, among the fifteen explanatory variables, eleven are found statistically 
significant to affect the odds and the models on the whole can predict about 75 percent of the cases correctly. 
Estimated coefficients of the variables pertaining to presently nonparticipating or past-participants, current-
participants and willing-nonparticipants’ characteristics reveal a number of interesting aspects of participation 
and nonparticipation of the rural poor in Bangladesh. 
In these three sets of models, where the three dependent variables are distinguished on the basis of 
nonparticipation or participation in the past (i.e. drop-out), participation at present and nonparticipation at 
present but willing to participate in the future, the study aims to identify the factors that determine the 
participation of the rural poor individually in MFIs. This is the reason for including the explanatory variables 
that reflect member-specific characteristics such as gender, age, general literacy level and occupational status. 
Several past studies incorporated similar demographic variables in explaining the dependent variables (see e.g. 
Zohir, 2001; Mahmud, 2000).  
The estimates of the Model 1 (for who are presently nonparticipants or drop-out) indicate that if an individual is 
female, the odds for the person willing to participate in the MFIs reduce by 60 percent. Relatively younger 
people are more willing to participate with a year rise in the age of the nonparticipants or drop-outs, the odds 
ratio reduces by 25 percent. However, for relatively more educated individual, the odds ratio increases by 66 
percent that the person being nonparticipant or drop-out. In the case of the parameter of yearly income, the odds 
appear to decrease the probability of nonparticipation in MFIs by 19 percent. The odds ratio of other assets also 
increases the probability of nonparticipation by 28 percent. These outcomes are supported by several past studies 
(Zohir, 2001; Mahmud, 2000). Hence, in order to increase participation, MFIs should include wide range of aged 
groups of people in society. Besides, more training ought to be provided by the MFIs to the illiterate poor for 
better knowledge and understanding of business skills. By this way, people would be more productive and can 
have better skills to attain more profit in their business. This will increase their income which would ease to pay 
back their regular installment of loans and in effect, it will reduce the drop-out rates from the MFIs.  
For religion, the odds indicate that nonparticipation by the rural poor in MFIs decreases by 40 percent. Religious 
restrictions in Islamic religion such as interest on borrowed funds as well as purdah for women are important 
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consideration for participating in MFIs. The results of this study reflect similar fact of the Muslim society of 
Bangladesh (Ashraf, 2013; Ahmed, 2009; Dyal-Chand, 2007).  The variable of spousal dislike also appears to 
indicate that its odds of nonparticipation increases by 50 percent. This result implies that gender, age, education, 
income level as well as religious restrictions are important consideration in explaining the participation as well 
as nonparticipation in MFIs (Zohir, 2001; Mahmud, 2000). For overcoming the religious problems, there is no 
other way except the introduction of Islamic MFIs. There have already been several Islamic MFIs working in 
Bangladesh such as Al-Falah, Nobel, Rescue and Rural Development Scheme of the Islami Bank Bangladesh 
Limited. These Islamic MFIs have better participation of the rural poor and drop-out rates are comparatively less 
than conventional MFIs (Mannan, 2010; Ahmed, 2002). 
The estimates of the Model 1 (for nonparticipants and who participated in MFIs before) indicate that there is a 
positive relationship between education, other assets and spousal dislike and the probability of the individual 
reporting that they never participated in MFIs before. The significance levels of 0.000 associated with these three 
variables indicate that there has been almost zero percent chance that the values of the coefficients are not 
significantly different from zero, i.e. there is about 100 percent chance that the coefficients of these variables are 
different from zero.  
This outcome implies that these variables may cause the individuals to induce them to have the membership of 
the MFIs before. In relation to the positive influence of the variable of spousal dislike to female head of 
household on the probability of participation before, earlier literature suggested that the female members whose 
family ties are contentious with their husbands are more prone to participate in MFIs than those who do not have 
such conflicts in the family (Ashraf, 2013; Karim, 2011). Nevertheless, the rural women who are single, widows 
or divorced or separated head of the family have more probability to take part in microfinance activities than 
those who have a good bond in the family (Zohir, 2001). In this context, only solution to this type of problem is 
to provide better education and training to the rural poor. In contents of the training, social and ethical values 
should also be incorporated which can improve the morality of the people as well mitigate the family problem to 
certain extent.   
Based on the significance of the variables in the fitted Model 1 (Table 2), it can also be portrayed that there have 
been potential negative association with gender, age and religion which are observed to be highly significant to 
influence negatively the participation of individuals who participated in MFIs before and never participated in 
MFIs. This result is supported by similar other study as well (Khandker, Koolwal and Sinha, 2008). There are 
other variables which are not significant to influence the participation behavior of the rural poor, but these 
coefficients indicate that these appear not to be potential barriers of participation in MFIs. 
The estimated values of model 2 (for the poor who are presently participating in MFIs) demonstrate that eleven 
variables excluding intercepts are statistically significant in influencing the participation of the rural poor in the 
study areas. Among them, the odds ratios of education, other assets, fear of getting into risk of loans, spousal 
dislike to female head of household and ill-health increase the probability of participation of the rural poor in 
MFIs by 85 percent, 45 percent, 32 percent, 40 percent and 5 percent respectively.   
Hence, the potential problems of participation for the model 2 are gender, age, yearly income, land, religion and 
lack of knowledge. This means that these are robust factors that inhibit the actual behavior of microfinance 
participation of the rural poor in the study areas. These outcomes are also supported by several past studies 
(Ashraf, 2013; Ferdous and Uddin, 2010; Ahmed, Narayan and Zaman, 2009; Khandker, Koolwal and Sinha, 
2008). 
The estimated figures of model 3 (for who are willing to participate in MFIs) show that eleven factors are 
appeared to be statistically significant to influence the participation of the rural poor who are presently 
nonparticipants and willing to participate in MFIs (Table 2). There have been four variables whose coefficients 
are associated with negative sign and those variables are gender, land, resources and lack of knowledge. Similar 
results are also obtained in several past studies (Zohir, 2001; Mahmud, 2000).  
Other seven factors have positive sign associated with their coefficients. This means that the factors, which 
exhibit negative signs, are prohibiting the poor’s willingness to participate in MFIs. Other sevens are influencing 
positively to be willing to participate in MFIs. The results of the model 3, thus, indicate that gender, amount of 
land, inadequate resource base and lack of required business knowledge are inhibiting willingness to participate 
in MFIs. So, in order to increase participation in MFIs, it is imperative to consider these variables. 
 
Conclusion 
The present research endeavors to identify the potential barriers to participation of the rural poor in MFIs in 
Bangladesh. The study employed three models such as model 1, model 2 and model 3. For the model 1, the 
dependent variable is nonparticipation or drop-out from the membership in MFIs. For the model 2, the dependent 
variable is participation in MFIs and in the model 3, the dependent variable is nonparticipation and willing to 
participate in MFIs.  
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The study postulated eight explanatory variables apart from seven demographic factors in order for determining 
the potential barriers. The logistic regression analysis results into different determinants that influence the 
participation behavior of the rural poor. Among the seven demographic variables, gender, age, education, yearly 
income, land and other assets appear to be common determining factors of participation for the aforementioned 
three models of analysis.  
In other eight explanatory variables, only four variables are observed to be common statistically significant 
variables to hinder the participation of the rural poor in MFIs in Bangladesh. Similar results are also available in 
other studies such as Zaman (1997), Zohir (2001) and Mahmud (2000). 
Hence, in order to increase the participation of the rural poor in MFIs with an ultimate objective of alleviating 
rural poverty, the policy planner must focus on the identified variables which inhibit the rural poor participation 
in MFIs in Bangladesh. If the microfinance programs are to serve the interests of the rural poor in society, certain 
institutional features may have to be changed in order to remove the barriers to participation in MFIs. Such as 
high cost of loans, membership criteria and weekly repayment system ought to be relaxed. Last but not least, the 
program must focus the strategy to maximize the welfare of the rural poor rather than the commercial motive of 
the MFIs.  
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